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MILITARY JUSTICE
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)
In Parker v. Levy, 1 the United States Supreme Court held that Articles 133 and 134 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice 2 are not
constitutionally vague under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, nor facially invalid under the first amendment because of
overbreadth.8
Levy entered the Army under the "Berry
Plan," 4 where he agreed to serve for two
years in the armed forces if permitted first to
complete his medical training. Throughout his
tour of duty, he was stationed at an Army hospital as Chief of the Dermatological Service
and assigned, as one of his functions, to train
Special Forces aid men. Since Levy neglected
1.417 U.S. 733 (1974).
2 These two articles are popularly known as the
General Articles.
10 U.S.C. § 933 (1970) provides:
Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is convicted of conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman shall be punished
as a court-martial may direct.
10 U.S.C. § 934 (1970) provides:
Though not specifically mentioned in this
chapter, all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring
discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes
and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be guilty, shall be
taken cognizance of by a general, special, or
summary court-martial, according to the nature and degree of the offense, and shall be
punished at the discretion of the court.
3 In addition, the Court upheld Levy's conviction
under Article 90, ruling that his contentions that
the commandant's order constituted participation in
a war crime and that the order was given solely
to increase his punishment were not of constitutional significance and were beyond the scope of
review since such defenses had been resolved
against Levy on a factual basis by the convicting
court-martial.
10 U.S.C. § 890(2) (1970) provides:
Any person subject to this chapter who
(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of
his superior commissioned officer, shall be
punished, if the offense is committed in time
of war, by death or such other punishment as
a court-martial may direct, and if the offense
is committed at any other time, by such punishment, other than death, as a court-martial
may direct.
4 50 U.S.C. § 454 (1970).

his duty to conduct the training program, a
court-martial convicted him of violating Article
90(2) by disobeying the hospital commandant's
order to establish a training program for the aid
men, and of violating Articles 133 and 134 by
making public statements urging black enlisted
men to refuse to obey orders to go to Vietnam,
and referring to Special Forces personnel as
"liars and thieves," "killers of peasants," and
"murderers of women and children!' 5 After
his conviction was sustained within the military, Levy petitioned for habeas corpus in the
United States district court challenging his
conviction on the grounds that both articles
were "void for vagueness" under the due process clause of the fifth amendment, and overbroad in violation of the first amendment. The
district court denied relief, citing in support
decisions of the United States Court of Military Appeals. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit reversed,6 holding that Articles
133 and 134 were void for vagueness.7 It
found that though Levy's conduct fell within
an example of Article 134 violations contained
in the Courts-Martial Manual,8 the possibility
that the articles would be applied in the future
to the conduct of others and would not provide
sufficient warning as to the scope of prohibited
conduct, or would be applied to conduct protected by the first amendment, gave Levy
standing to challenge the facial validity of both
articles.9 The court also ordered a new trial
5 417 U.S. at 737.
6478 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1973).
7 The court of appeals held that the articles
failed to meet the requirements at the heart of the
vagueness doctrine. They did not provide the person of ordinary intelligence with a reasonable opportunity to know what was prohibited, and they
did not set out explicit standards so as to prevent
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 478 F2d
at 778-79, citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
8 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UN=TED STATES
(1969 Revised ed.). [Hereinafter cited as MANUAL.]

9 The court relied extensively on Gooding v.
Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972), which involved a
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since joint consideration of Article 90 charges
gave rise to a reasonable possibility that Levy's
right to a fair trial had been prejudiced. The
government appealed to the Supreme Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).'°
Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for a five
man majority, reversed." The majority premised its opinion on what it saw as distinctions
between the military and the civilian communities, and between the military and civilian law.
The majority found that the Supreme Court
had historically recognized that the military is,
by necessity, a specialized society, separate from
its civilian counterpart, whose primary business
is to fight, or be ready to fight, wars. Governed
by a separate discipline from that of the civilian, the "rights of men in the armed forces
must perforce be conditioned to meet certain
overriding demands of discipline and duty." .
Georgia statute providing that any person who,
without provocation, "uses to or of another, and in
his presence . . . opprobrious words or abusive

language, tending to cause a breach of the peace"
is guilty of a misdemeanor. GA. CODE ANN.

§

26-2610 (1972).
The Supreme Court held that the statute on its
face was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
under the first and fourteenth amendments. Even
though the words Wilson used might have been
constitutionally prohibited under a narrowly drawn
statute, the possible chilling effect of constitutionally protected expression gave him standing to attack the statute.
'0 Justice Rehnquist first disposed of a question
of jurisdiction involving 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970).
Levy had urged a lack of jurisdiction in the Supreme Court because the attorneys filing and serving notice of appeal were not attorneys of record
and because the attorneys effecting service failed
to comply with Rule 33.3(c) of the Supreme
Court. Alternatively, Levy contended that § 1252
was not intended to permit appeals from the court
of appeals, but only from the district court. The
Court held that "any court of the United States,"
as used in § 1252, included the court of appeals
and that technical non-compliance with Rule 33
did not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. 417 U.S.
at 742 n.10.
"Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Powell.
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring statement
joined by the Chief Justice. See note 37 infra.
Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion. See note
47 infra. Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Douglas, filed a dissenting opinion. Justice
Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
12 417 U.S. at 744 citing Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137, 140 (1953). There is one express exemption of service personnel from the protections
found in the Bill of Rights. The fifth amendment
dispenses with the required presentment or indict-
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Justice Rehnquist traced the antecedents of
Articles 133 and 134, noting that British military law contained the forebears of these two
articles in remarkably similar language. In
1775, the Continental Congress adopted those
two articles from the British Articles of War
of 1765,13 and they remained substantially the
same through numerous re-enactments. 1 4 In
1951, they were enacted as Articles 133 and
134 of the military code.
Paralleling this development, the majority
cited Dynes v. Hoover,15 Smith v. Whitney,16
United States v. Fletcher,'7 and Swaim v.
United States' for the consistently recognized
proposition that the "customary military law"
or "general usage of the military service,"
gave accepted meaning to the seemingly imprecise language of the two articles.' 9 As a consequence, the civil courts, including the Supreme
Court, had confined their review of the acts of
a court-martial to the narrow question of
ment by a grand jury "in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual
service in time of war or public danger." In addition, by practice and construction, the words "all
criminal prosecutions" in the sixth amendment do
not necessarily cover all military trials such that
the guarantee of trial "by an impartial jury" is
not applicable to military trials.
See generally Quinn, The United States Court
of Military Appeals and Military Due Process, 35
ST. JoHN's L. REv. 225 (1961); Sherman, The
Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAiNl L. REv.
1 (1970).
'3417 U.S. at 745 nn. 11 & 12, citing W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 945-46
(2d ed. 1920). Justice Rehnquist also cited the
Articles of the Earl of Essex (1642).
14 The predecessor of Article 133 was included
in a new set of articles adopted in 1776, readopted in 1786, and revised and expanded in 1806.
The predecessor of Article 134 was also included
in the 1776 articles, and revised once in 1916. Otherwise, substantially the same language of both articles was preserved throughout.
15 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) (seaman charged
with desertion but convicted instead of attemped
desertion).
16 116 U.S. 167 (1886) (Navy Paymaster General charged with "scandalous conduct" and "culpable inefficiency" in carrying out his duties).
17 148 U.S. 84 (1893) (retired officer charged in
connection with the incurrence and nonpayment of
debts).
18 165 U.S. 553 (1897) (Judge-Advocate General
of the Army accused of fraud, charged with conduct unbecoming an officer, but convicted of conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline).
19 417 U.S. at 747-48.
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jurisdiction. 20 In Dynes, the Court had reasoned there would be little likelihood of abuse,
notwithstanding the apparent vagueness of the
General Articles because
what those crimes are, and how they are to be
punished, is well known by practical men in
the navy and army, and by those who have
studied the law of courts-martial and the offenses of which2 the different courts-martial
have cognizance. 1
In addition, the Court had concluded in Smith
that military men rather than civilian judicial
officers were better able to judge any cases
which might arise.2 2 Those trained in civilian
law lacked familiarity with the military's
"higher code termed honor" which held its
society to stricter accountability.P Cases involving conduct to the prejudice of good order
and discipline were still further beyond the
bounds of civilian judicial judgment because
they required actual knowledge and experience
24
of military life
20

This court, although the question of issuing
a writ of prohibition to a court-martial has
not come before it for direct adjudication, has
repeatedly recognized the general rule that the
acts of a court-martial, within the scope of its
jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or
reviewed in the civil courts by writ of prohibition or otherwise.
Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 177 (1886) (citations omitted).
With the sentences of courts-martial which
have been convened regularly, and have proceeded legally, and by which punishments are
directed, not forbidden by law, or which are
according to the laws and customs of the sea,
civil courts have nothing to do, nor are they
in any way alterable by them. If it were otherwise, the civil courts would virtually administer the rules and articles of war irrespective
of those to whom that duty and obligation
have been confided by the laws of the United
States, from whose decisions no appeal or jurisdiction of any kind has been given to the
civil magistrates or civil courts.
Dynes v. Hoover,. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82
(1857).
21Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82
(1857).
22 116 U.S. at 178.
23 Fletcher v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 541, 563
(1891).
24 Justice Rehnquist's statement here came from
the Court of Claims decision in Swaim v. United
States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 228 (1893). Interestingly
enough, that court, though citing examples such as
slapping a woman in the face or insulting an unprotected girl as conduct unbecoming an officer,
did not cite examples of conduct prejudicial to
good order and discipline.

The majority reasoned that the differences
between the military and civilian communities
and between military and civilian law continue
to exist under the present military code. The
code cannot be equated to the civilian criminal
code for it "essays more varied regulation of a
much larger segment of the activities of the
more tightly knit military community." 25 At
the same time, enforcement of minor offenses
under the code is often by sanctions more ad26
ministrative or civil in nature than criminal.
Justice Rehnquist proposed that this is due in
part to the different relationship between the
governmen and servicemen: not only that of law
27
giver to citizen, but of employer to employee.
In sum, because of these differences between the
military and civilian societies, military personnel cannot enjoy the same measure of autonomy as enjoyed by their counterparts in the
larger civilian community.
Justice Rehnquist used Smith v. Goguen25 as
the reference point for a discussion of Levy's
vagueness challenges to the constitutionality of
Articles 133 and 134. In civilian law, notions
of fair warning are paramount; moreover,
legislatures must set reasonably clear guidelines to prevent arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Where a statute's literal scope, unaided by a narrowing interpretation, reaches
first amendment protected expression, then
even greater specificity is required.2 9 The majority asserted that both articles met these requirements. The military courts had extensively construed each article, at least partially
narrowing its scope. Article 134, for example,
must be judged "not in vacuo, but in the context in which the years have placed it." 0 Not
25 417 U.S. at 749.
26 Under 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1970), a commanding
officer may impose certain disciplinary, non-judicial puninshments including withholding of privileges, restriction to certain specified limits, extra
duty, reduction in grade under certain circumstances, forfeiture of pay, or confinement if the
person is attached to or embarked in a vessel.
27 417 U.S. at 751.
28415 U.S. 566 (1974). The case involved a conviction under the Massachusetts flag desecration
statute where the defendant had sewn a small
United States flag to the seat of his trousers. The
Court found the challenged language, "treats contemptuously," to be unconstitutionally vague.
29417 U.S. at 752, citing Smith v. Goguen, 415
U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974).
30417 U.S. at 752, quoting United States v.
Frantz, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 161, 163, 7 C.M.R. 37, 38
(1953).
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every irregular or improper act is a court-martial offense but only conduct which is "directly
and palpably-as distinguished from indirectly
and remotely-prejudicial to good order and
discipline." 31 In addition, the Courts-Martial
Manual restated these limitations2 and provided
3
over sixty illustrative examples.
The effect of these constructions was to both
narrow the broad reach of the literal language
of the articles, and simultaneously supply considerable specificity of application in the examples. If areas of uncertainty still remain, the
majority felt that less formalized custom and
usage would adequately provide further
content. 33
Levy's conduct clearly fell within the range
of both articles. Admitting this, the Court
found that the court of appeals erred in conferring standing on him to challenge the imprecise
language of the articles as they might apply to
34
other hypothetical situations.
The majority noted that the Court had indeed invalidated statutes under the fifth or
fourteenth due process clauses because they
contained no standard whatever by which to
judge criminality; but, Articles 133 and 134
did not fall within that group. Rather, similar
to those in Smith v. Goguen, these are statutes
that "by their terms or as authoritatively construed apply without question to certain activities, but whose application to other behavior is
uncertain." 35
Though Smith v. Goguen also teaches that
more precision in drafting may be necessary in
cases involving the regulation of expression,
31417 U.S. at 753, quoting United States v.
Sadinsky, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 565, 34 C.M.R. 343,
345 (1964).
32 See text accompanying notes 62-66 infra for
Justice Stewart's critical view of these "illustrative
examples."
33 Justice Rehnquist cited Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857) to support this, but
neither that case nor succeeding cases explicitly
defined what was meant by "custom and usage."
34 Justice Rehnquist surmised that the holding
of the court of appeals stemmed from an erroneous blending of the doctrines of vagueness and
overbreadth. 417 U.S. at 755-56.
35 4.5 U.S. at 578. This remark was part of a
discussion of the status of "hard-core" violators
under vague statutes. A "hard-core" violation connotes conduct which a statute, by its terms, plainly
forbids. It would be difficult to find such violations
in Article 134; conduct covered in the examples
given is too disparate to allow for a coherent generalization.
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the majority concluded that because of the
characteristics distinguishing military from civilian society, Congress should be permitted to
legislate with greater breadth and flexibility
when prescribing rules for the former. The
proper standard of review of vagueness challenges to articles in the military code is that
which applies to criminal statutes regulating
economic affairs. 38 Thus, in determining the
sufficiency of notice, the Court will scrutinize
the application of the statute to the conduct
with which the defendant was charged, rather
than consider only the facial validity of the
statute.37 The Court reasoned that under the
circumstances, Levy could have had no reasonable doubt that his statements violated Articles
133 and 134. 3s
Levy's contention that the two articles were
facially invalid because of overbreadth fared no
36 417 U.S. at 756.
37 Though the majority cited United States v.
National Dairy Corp. 372 U.S. 29 (1963) in support, its reliance would appear to be misplaced in
light of that Court's observation that the approach
to "vagueness" governing a case such as National
Dairy differs from that followed in first amendment cases where the concern is with the vagueness of a statute "on its face" because such vagueness may deter constitutionally protected and
socially desirable conduct. No such factor would
be present in the National Dairy case where the
statute is directed only at conduct designed to destroy competition, activity which is neither constitutionally protected nor socially desirable. Thus,
the application of the National Dairy rule to the
Parker v. Levy type case would seem inappropriate.
38
This conclusion was partially based on the
fact that the military does not presume that every
man knows the law, but rather requires that its
personnel be advised of the contents of the military code. 10 U.S.C. § 937 (1970). However, Justice Stewart noted that only a minute portion of
the training period was set aside for such education. 417 U.S. at 782 n.27 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun's short concurring opinion
concentrated on this issue. Should Levy have
known that his conduct violated Articles 133 and
134? Justice Blackmun asserted that what was at
issue were fundamental concepts of "right" and
"wrong" which had not changed over the centuries. The General Articles embodied these concepts
and were necessary to maintain a disciplined and
obedient fighting force. Justice Blackmun foresaw
little problem with arbitrary enforcement because
of the elaborate system of military justice. In addition, any arbitrary treatment would produce an
ineffective military organization. He concluded
that civilian law should accommodate, in special
circumstances, law systems which expect more of
the individual in a broader variety of relationships
than one finds in civilian life.
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better. Noting the Court's ruling in Gooding v.
Wilson,"9 relied on extensively by the court of
appeals, the majority observed that even
though servicemen are protected by the first
amendment, the necessity for obedience and
discipline might "render permissible within the
military that which would be constitutionally
impermissible outside it." 40 First amendment
doctrines are not exempt from this principle.
The majority recalled the observation by the
Court of Military Appeals that the military must
rely on a command structure that at times sends
men into combat, "not only hazarding their
lives but ultimately involving the security of the
Nation itself." 41 Speech, protected in the civilian arena, might undermine the effective response to command, and would therefore be
constitutionally unprotected in the military
arena.
The majority then considered standing in a
claim of first amendment overbreadth. Traditionally, a litigant may not assert the rights of
others not before the court. An exception,
permitting a challenge of a statute as it might
be applied in future hypothetical situations, has
been recognized in first amendment cases because of the most "weighty countervailing
policies." 42 However, the Court for various
reasons concluded that such policies should be
given considerably less weight in the military
courts. Among these reasons was the Court's
reluctance to invalidate a statute which might
be validly applied in a substantial number of
situations. In addition, where conduct as well
as speech would be involved, the overbreadth
should "not only be real but substantial as
well, judged in relation to the statute's legiti39 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
40 417 U.S. at 758.
41Id., quoting United States v. Priest, 21
U.S.C.M.A. 564, 570, 45 C.M.R. 338, 342 (1972).
42 A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually involved imponderables and contingencies that may themselves inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment
freedoms. When statutes also have an overbroad sweep . . . the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of these rights may be
critical.... Because of the sensitive nature of
constitutionally protected expression, we have
not required that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test their
rights. For free expression-of transcendent
value to all society, and not merely to those
exercising their fights-might be the loser.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1964).

mate sweep." 43 Thus, even if there were marginal applications in which Articles 133 and
134 should infringe on first amendment values,
facial invalidation would be inappropriate. The
Court also found that Levy's conduct, in: urging enlisted men to disobey orders, was clearly
unprotected under the "most expansive
notions" 4 of the first amendment, and just as
clearly fell within the reach of both articles.
Finally, the same reasons which dictated a different application of first amendment principles
in the military context would apply in relation
to the question of standing. Thus, Levy lacked
the requisite standing to challenge the constitutionality of Articles 133 and 134.
Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Douglas -5
and Brennan, authored the principal dissent,
firing a broadside attack on the "patently unconstitutional" General Articles. The opinion,
divided into two parts, is essentially an answer
to the major points put forth by the majority.
In the first part of the dissent, Justice Stewart challenged the constitutionality of each article on its face. Vague statutes suffer from two
fatal constitutional defects. First, they fail to
-1 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615
(1973). Justice Rehnquist relied on this case and
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973) to support this point. Both cases involved
vagueness and overbreadth challenges to btatutes
forbidding employees, state and federal respectively, from actively engaging in partisan political
activity. In contrast to the General Articles, however, the Oklahoma statute is more precise and
specific, and the Hatch Act, held constitutional in
United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75
(1947), is part of an extended and well-documented effort by the federal government to limit
partisan
political activities by its employees.
44
Justice Rehnquist did not refer to any case or
commentary to illustrate which expansive notion of
the first amendment he referred to, but he probably was directing this remark to Justice Douglas
who in his dissent stated that comment on one of
the most controversial public issues of the day
could not "by any stretch of the dictionary meaning" come within the prohibitions of Article 134.
45 justice Douglas' separate dissent emphasized
the first amendment-free speech aspect of the case.
Justice Douglas conceded the military's need for
discipline and obedience with its inevitable curtailment of liberty, but maintained that the first
amendment on its face recognized no exceptions.
Even though the military's tendency to produce
"homogenized" individuals had resulted in substantial limitation on expressions of opinion, to punish
someone for uttering his or her beliefs was an
abridgement of speech in the most fundamental
sense.
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provide fair notice of exactly which acts are forbidden, thereby requiring men of "common in46
telligence" to speculate as to their meaning.
Second, such statutes fail to provide explicit
standards for the officials who enforce them,
thereby inviting arbitrary and discriminatory
47
enforcement.
The dissent argued that the General Articles
clearly suffered from facial vagueness. In fact,
the majority admitted as much.4" More significantly, the military courts, in describing the
kinds of acts forbidden under Articles 133 and
134, had employed several terms found in civilian statutes which the Supreme Court had in
the past held unconstitutional. 49 Nor had narrowing judicial constructions cured the facial
vagueness. Instead, the Court of Military Appeals repeatedly cited Winthrop's Military Law
and Precedents, a work which, in attempting
to give some meaning to the articles, suffered
from the same vagueness as the statutes it purportedly explained. Justice Stewart quoted
Winthrop's description of "conduct unbecoming
an officer" as an example:
To constitute therefore the conduct here denounced, the act which forms the basis of the
charge must have a double significance and ef6 justice Stewart cited two leading cases which
had held statutes void for vagueness: Lanzetta v.
New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (New Jersey
statute defining gangster in terms of membership
in a gang and previous conviction); Connally v.
General Construction Co, 269 U.S. 385 (1926)
(Oklahoma statutes imposing cumulative penalties
on contractors doing business with the state who
paid workmen less than the current rate).
47 As support, Justice Stewart cited Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1971)
and Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104
(1972). The former involved a vagrancy ordinance.
which the Court viewed as an open invitation to
arbitrary and erratic arrests (and which failed to
provide fair notice as well). In the latter, however, the Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance relating to schools because the requirements of the
ordinance defined sufficiently distinct boundaries by
which to guide enforcement officials.
48417 U.S. at 776. Justice Stewart is technically
correct; but, the majority was not bothered by
this since it found that any facial imprecision had
been cured by judicial interpretation, or could be
cured by application of less formalized military
custom.
-4 Id. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402
U.S. 611 (1971) ("annoying" conduct); Giaccio v.
Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1969) ("misconduct"); Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952)
(conduct "prejudicial to the best interests" of a
city).
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fect. Though it need not amount to crime, it
must offend so seriously against law, justice,
morality or decorum as to expose to disgrace,
socially or as a man, the offender, and at the
same time must be of such a nature or committed under such circumstances as to bring
dishonor or disrepute upon the military profession which he represents5o
In addition, Winthrop had interpreted the predecessor of Article 134 as applying to conduct
whose prejudice to good order and discipline
was "reasonably direct and palpable" as opposed -to that which was -"indirectly or remotely" prejudicial. 5 1 For the dissenters, these
interpretations scarcely added substantive
52
content.
In the second part of the opinion, the dissent
attacked the majority's proposition that the
General Articles were "models of clarity to
practical men in the services," and that Levy
should have known his conduct fell within the
proscriptions of the General Articles since the
Courts-Martial Manual gave specific content to
the imprecise statutes.
In five decisions 53 spanning the last half of the
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had upheld against constitutional attack the ancestors
of Articles 133 and 134. But, Justice Stewart
pointed out, those cases were decided in an environment vastly different from the present one.
At that time, the army and navy were small,
professional, and composed of career volunteers.
The military was a unique society, isolated
from the mainstream of civilian life. It would
50 417 U.S. at 777, quoting W. WINTHROP, MrLITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS

711-12 (2d ed. 1920).

Justice Rehnquist cites precisely the same quotation for the opposite conclusion; neither Justice,
however, analyzes the passage in any detail in attempting to support his position.
51W. WINTHROP, MILITARY
DENTS 723 (2d ed. 1920).
52

LAW

AND PRECE-

In sum, the dissent charged that the General
Articles are, in practice as well as theory, catchalls designed to permit prosecution for practically
any conduct offending a military commander. One
commentator noted that an amazing variety of conduct could be made subject to court-martial under
these articles, "limited only by the scope of a commander's creativity or spleen." Sherman, The Civilianization of Military Law, 22 MAINE L. REv. 3,

80 (1970).
53 Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365 (1902);
Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897);
United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84 (1893);
Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1886) ; Dynes v.
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
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at least be plausible for one to assume that its
volunteers knew, through custom and instinct,
what kinds of acts fell within the range of the
General Articles. The armed forces of the
1960's, on the other hand, numbered in the
millions, a large percentage being conscripts or
draft-induced volunteers with no prior military
experience and little prospect of remaining beyond their initial period of obligation. Dr. Levy
was just such an individual, 54 and it would be
little short of judicial fantasy to assume that
he, and others like him, were so instilled with
the traditions of the military as to comprehend
the meaning of the General Articles. In sum,
Dynes and its progeny were ready for retirement from active service.
Though the Courts-Martial Manual contained an appendix of "Forms for Charges and
Specifications," 55 they did not provide the
kind of specific, definitive interpretation necessary to save the articles from unconstitutionality. The list of specifications covering the
General Articles was not exclusive, continued
to grow, and failed to contain any unifying
theme which would give generic definition to
the articles' vague terms. Most significantly,
the fact that certain conduct was listed in the
appendix did not guarantee that it violated either article. The sample specifications, in effect, were procedural guides only, not intended
to create offenses. Thus, the Court of Military
Appeals had on occasion disapproved Article
134 convictions even though the conduct in
question was listed in the form specifications.5"
But, facial invalidity was not the only problem. The dissent could not see how Levy could
possibly have known that his conduct violated
54Justice Stewart noted that Dr. Levy, unlike
many other medical officers entering active service,
had not attended a basic orientation course, and
while at his duty post had received little military
training, only a small part of which concerned
military justice. 417 U.S. at 782 n.26.
55

5 MAN

AL,

App. 6c.

Though the Court in Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 38 (1957), appeared to leave open the
question as to what extent the executive had the
inherent power to promulgate, supplement, or
change substantive military law, Justice Stewart
noted that the Court of Military Appeals in
United States v. Smith, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 105, 32
C.M.R. 105 .(1962), and United States v. McCormick, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 26, 30 C.M.R. 26 (1960),
had indicated its belief that the Congress did not
and could not give the President this power. 417
U.S. at 784-85 and n.36.

Article 134. In fact, the specification relating
to the making of statements "disloyal to the
United States," 57 was itself so vague that one
federal district court had declared it unconstitutional. 58 Even if a consensus as to the meaning of "disloyal" could be obtained, the dissent
was not prepared to characterize Dr. Levy's
conduct as such. "Whatever the accuracy of
these views. I would be loath to impute 'disloyalty' to those who honestly held them." 55
Indeed, Justice Stewart noted that many
Americans shared Dr. Levy's viewpoint.
Even though Justice Stewart found both articles unconstitutionally vague under the standards normally applied by the Court, he looked
at the military's peculiar situation to see if any
considerations might require the application of
a more relaxed standard of judicial review. He
found none.
The dissent protested that the issue vas not
whether the military might, under the Constitution, adopt substantive rules different from
those governing civilian society, but whether a
serviceman had "the same right as his civilian
counterpart to be informed as to precisely what
conduct those rules proscribe before he can be
criminally punished for violating them." 60
Even though the military might justify substantive rules of law wholly foreign to civilian
life, if such rules were so vague as to be incomprehensible and allow for arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement, then such laws can
"in the end only hamper the military's objectives of high morale and esprit de corps." 6 1
Parker v. Levy is not a Supreme Court case
which can be characterized as the "latest in a
long line." In Dynes, the Court held that
military courts were not part of the federal judiciary under article III, but rather established
pursuant to articles I and 11. 12 As a result,
federal courts were limited in their review of
military court decisions to narrow jurisdictional grounds, turning aside all other challenges to the articles. 3 The court-martial sys57 MANUAL,

App. 6c, spec. 139.

58 Stolte v. Laird, 353 F. Supp. 1392 (D.D.C.
1970).
59 417 U.S. at 786.
60 Id. at 787.
61
Id. at 788.
62 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 78-9 (1857).
63 Id. at 82. Accord, Swaim v. United States,
165 U.S. at 561 (". .. the court-martial having jur-
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tern was allowed to develop as an autonomous
legal system with procedures and statutes
largely unaffected by civilian notions of criminal law and of procedural and substantive due
process. Only recently, the Supreme Court has
held that military courts, like all other courts,
must protect a person's constitutional rights. 64
But, civilian review through habeas corpus petitions has not expanded significantly and the
Court still maintains a healthy respect for the
military and its ways. 65
Accordingly, few cases have come to the civilian courts in which the constitutionality of
the General Articles has been challenged and
fewer still in which the challenge was based on
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.6" Most
cases involving constitutional challenges to the
General Articles have arisen within the military justice system. Unfortunately, the efforts
of the military courts in this area have been
undistinguished, marked by too little familiarity with civilian precedents and too little appreciation of the issues. 67 Three cases on
isdiction... and

having

acted within

the scope

of its lawful powers, its proceedings and sentence
cannot be reviewed or set aside by the civil courts").
United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. at 92 ("As the
court-martial had jurisdiction, errors in its excercise, if any, cannot be reviewed in this proceeding.") ; Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. at 177 ("And
this court.., has repeatedly recognized the general
rule that the acts of a court-martial, within the
scope of its jurisdiction and duty, cannot be controlled or reviewed in the civil courts...").
64 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258, 273
(1969) ; Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140
(1953).
65 For a discussion of the scope of military habeas corpus review, see Comment, Habeas Corpus
and the Military: The Crippled Attack on
Courts-Martial, 61 Ky. L.J. 333 (1972); Note,
Federal Jurisdiction-An Apparent Expansion of
the Scope of Military Habeas Corms Review, 80
N.C. L. REv. 173 (1971); Note, Federal Habeas
Corpus Jurisdiction over Courts-Martial Proceedings,
66 20 WAYNE L. REv. 919 (1974).
justice Douglas' opinion in O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), touched briefly on
the vagueness issue in relation to Article 134,
questioning whether the article's imprecise language satisfied vagueness standards developed by
the civilian courts. In Stolte v. Laird, 353 F.Supp.
1392 (D.D.C. 1970) the plaintiffs, convicted of uttering statements disloyal to the United States, asserted and the district court so held, that the "disloyal statement" specification under Article 134
was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad on its
face
and as applied.
67
United States v. Vorhees, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 509,
16 C.M.R. 83 (1954) was one of the first cases
recognizing the application of the first amendment
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which the Parkerv. Levy majority relied illustrate this point.
In United States 'v. Howe, 68 the defendant
challenged both articles as vague and overbroad, but the military court rejected these arguments and concluded that the constitutionality of Article 133 had "seemingly never been
in doubt." 69 The Court of Military Appeals
dealt with vagueness challenges to Article 134
in United States v. Frant70 and United States
v. Sadinsky.7' In Frantz, the court dismissed
the constitutional challenge in light of considerations "so patent and so compelling as to
dispense with the necessity for their enumeration-much less their argumentive
development." 72 Eleven years later, the Sadinsky court cited this reasoning for the "well-settled" proposition that Article 134 is not void
for vagueness.75
Parker v. Levy is significant if only because
the Supreme Court has for the first time measured the constitutionality of the General Articles against standards of vagueness and overbreadth. In holding them constitutional,
though, the Court has established a disturbing
precedent. The Court began by measuring both
articles against traditional civilian standards of
vagueness and overbreadth, and found them
constitutional, but then proceeded to adapt these
standards to the special situation of the military in such a way as to make them all but
meaningless. Though the case should not be
seen as signaling a general erosion of vagueness or overbreadth standards, it does indicate
that the Court will manipulate traditional
standards of vagueness and overbreadth in special circumstances.
to the military. The principal opinion held that
servicemen's first amendment rights were limited
by the requirements of military necessity, and the
concurring opinion gave only grudging recognition
to the applicability of the first amendment. Only
the third judge, in dissent, displayed an awareness
of the broad first amendment precedents of the
Supreme Court including the preferred position of
free speech, the constitutional prohibition on prior
restraint and the problems of vagueness and overbreadth. See generally Sherman, The Military
Courts and Servicemen's First Amendment Rights,
22 HASTINGS L.J. 325 (1971).
68 17 U.S.C.M.A. 165, 37 C.M.R. 429 (1967).
69 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 176.
702 U.C.M.A. 161, 7 C.M.R. 37 (1953).
7114 U.S.C.M.A. 563, 34 C.M.R. 343 (1964).
722 U.S.C.M.A. at 163-64.
73 14 U.S.CM.A. at 364.
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Further, though previous Supreme Court
cases have recognized differences between military and civilian law, this case explicitly fashions a distinct rule for the military. This was
done on the basis of an uncritical analysis of
the conflicting interests of personal freedoms
and the military need for obedience and discipline. Few would question the need for discipline and obedience in the military, but the parameters of those requirements must be
defined. There is a difference between the desire to establish an environment where only
officially popular opinion may be expressed,
and the need for obedience to legitimate
authority.7 4
7 See Note, Dissenting Seruicemen and the
FirstAmendment, 58 Gao. L.J. 534 (1970).

The effects of Parker v. Levy are already
discernible.7 5 In all likelihood, the courts will
decide future cases in much the same fashion
as the Supreme Court dealt with Parker,
turning aside constitutional challenges of
vagueness and overbreadth on the basis of the
military's special situation. The question remains whether further exceptions to traditional
vagueness and overbreadth standards can be
carved out because of the existence of a "special situation."
75 Three weeks after its decision in Parker v.
Levy, the Supreme Court decided Navy v. Avrech,
U.S. - (1974), reversing the court of appeals
on the authority of Parker. In that case, Avrech
had been charged under the disloyal statement
specification under Article 134 and had challenged
it on vagueness and overbreadth grounds.

